

APPEAL NO. 031964
FILED SEPTEMBER 9, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on July 14, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) on May 10, 1999, with a 4% impairment rating (IR). The claimant appeals these determinations. The respondent (carrier) urges affirmance of the hearing officer's decision.

DECISION

Affirmed.

Sections 408.122(c) and 408.125(e) provide that where there is a dispute as to the date of MMI and the IR, the report of the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission-selected designated doctor is entitled to presumptive weight unless it is contrary to the great weight of the other medical evidence. Tex. W.C. Comm'n, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.6(i) (Rule 130.6(i)) provides that the designated doctor's response to a request for clarification is also considered to have presumptive weight, as it is part of the designated doctor's opinion. See *also*, Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 013042-s, decided January 17, 2002. We have previously discussed the meaning of "the great weight of the other medical evidence" in numerous cases. We have held that it is not just equally balancing the evidence or a preponderance of the evidence that can overcome the presumptive weight given to the designated doctor's report. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92412, decided September 28, 1992. We have also held that no other doctor's report, including the report of the treating doctor, is accorded the special, presumptive status accorded to the report of the designated doctor. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92366, decided September 10, 1992; Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93825, decided October 15, 1993.

Whether the great weight of the other medical evidence was contrary to the opinion of the designated doctor was a factual question for the hearing officer to resolve. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93459, decided July 15, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.

Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). In this case, we are satisfied that the hearing officer's MMI and IR determinations are sufficiently supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we cannot agree that the hearing officer erred in determining that the claimant reached MMI on May 10, 1999, with a 4% IR.

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**DOROTHY C. LEADERER
1999 BRYAN STREET, SUITE 1000
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

Chris Cowan
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Thomas A. Knapp
Appeals Judge

Edward Vilano
Appeals Judge